proxmark3/client/loclass/elite_crack.h
iceman1001 dc25f9212f FIX: 'hf iclass sim 2'
FIX: 'hf iclass sim 4'
FIX: 'hf iclass loclass' - this fixes the bug where loclass assumes the epurse value is all zeros, while it now should save the epurse value during the simulation if it is updated/read.

I assume a empty valid epurse, while an all zero epurse is too much easy to detect as a anomaly.
2018-02-04 00:52:29 +01:00

145 lines
5.3 KiB
C

/*****************************************************************************
* WARNING
*
* THIS CODE IS CREATED FOR EXPERIMENTATION AND EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY.
*
* USAGE OF THIS CODE IN OTHER WAYS MAY INFRINGE UPON THE INTELLECTUAL
* PROPERTY OF OTHER PARTIES, SUCH AS INSIDE SECURE AND HID GLOBAL,
* AND MAY EXPOSE YOU TO AN INFRINGEMENT ACTION FROM THOSE PARTIES.
*
* THIS CODE SHOULD NEVER BE USED TO INFRINGE PATENTS OR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS.
*
*****************************************************************************
*
* This file is part of loclass. It is a reconstructon of the cipher engine
* used in iClass, and RFID techology.
*
* The implementation is based on the work performed by
* Flavio D. Garcia, Gerhard de Koning Gans, Roel Verdult and
* Milosch Meriac in the paper "Dismantling IClass".
*
* Copyright (C) 2014 Martin Holst Swende
*
* This is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as published
* by the Free Software Foundation, or, at your option, any later version.
*
* This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with loclass. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*
****************************************************************************/
#ifndef ELITE_CRACK_H
#define ELITE_CRACK_H
void permutekey(uint8_t key[8], uint8_t dest[8]);
/**
* Permutes a key from iclass specific format to NIST format
* @brief permutekey_rev
* @param key
* @param dest
*/
void permutekey_rev(uint8_t key[8], uint8_t dest[8]);
//Crack status, see below
#define CRACKED 0x0100
#define BEING_CRACKED 0x0200
#define CRACK_FAILED 0x0400
/**
* Perform a bruteforce against a file which has been saved by pm3
*
* @brief bruteforceFile
* @param filename
* @param keytable an arrah (128 x 16 bit ints). This is where the keydata is stored.
* OBS! the upper part of the 16 bits store crack-status,
* @return
*/
int bruteforceFile(const char *filename, uint16_t keytable[]);
/**
*
* @brief Same as above, if you don't care about the returned keytable (results only printed on screen)
* @param filename
* @return
*/
int bruteforceFileNoKeys(const char *filename);
/**
* @brief Same as bruteforcefile, but uses a an array of dumpdata instead
* @param dump
* @param dumpsize
* @param keytable
* @return
*/
int bruteforceDump(uint8_t dump[], size_t dumpsize, uint16_t keytable[]);
/**
This is how we expect each 'entry' in a dumpfile to look
**/
typedef struct {
uint8_t csn[8];
uint8_t cc_nr[12];
uint8_t mac[4];
} dumpdata;
/**
* @brief Performs brute force attack against a dump-data item, containing csn, cc_nr and mac.
*This method calculates the hash1 for the CSN, and determines what bytes need to be bruteforced
*on the fly. If it finds that more than three bytes need to be bruteforced, it aborts.
*It updates the keytable with the findings, also using the upper half of the 16-bit ints
*to signal if the particular byte has been cracked or not.
*
* @param dump The dumpdata from iclass reader attack.
* @param keytable where to write found values.
* @return
*/
int bruteforceItem(dumpdata item, uint16_t keytable[]);
/**
* Hash1 takes CSN as input, and determines what bytes in the keytable will be used
* when constructing the K_sel.
* @param csn the CSN used
* @param k output
*/
void hash1(uint8_t csn[] , uint8_t k[]);
void hash2(uint8_t *key64, uint8_t *outp_keytable);
/**
* From dismantling iclass-paper:
* Assume that an adversary somehow learns the first 16 bytes of hash2(K_cus ), i.e., y [0] and z [0] .
* Then he can simply recover the master custom key K_cus by computing
* K_cus = ~DES(z[0] , y[0] ) .
*
* Furthermore, the adversary is able to verify that he has the correct K cus by
* checking whether z [0] = DES enc (K_cus , ~K_cus ).
* @param keytable an array (128 bytes) of hash2(kcus)
* @param master_key where to put the master key
* @return 0 for ok, 1 for failz
*/
int calculateMasterKey(uint8_t first16bytes[], uint64_t master_key[] );
/**
* @brief Test function
* @return
*/
int testElite();
/**
Here are some pretty optimal values that can be used to recover necessary data in only
eight auth attempts.
// CSN HASH1 Bytes recovered //
{ {0x00,0x0B,0x0F,0xFF,0xF7,0xFF,0x12,0xE0} , {0x01,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x45,0x01,0x45,0x45 } ,{0,1 }},
{ {0x00,0x13,0x94,0x7e,0x76,0xff,0x12,0xe0} , {0x02,0x0c,0x01,0x00,0x45,0x01,0x45,0x45} , {2,12}},
{ {0x2a,0x99,0xac,0x79,0xec,0xff,0x12,0xe0} , {0x07,0x45,0x0b,0x00,0x45,0x01,0x45,0x45} , {7,11}},
{ {0x17,0x12,0x01,0xfd,0xf7,0xff,0x12,0xe0} , {0x03,0x0f,0x00,0x00,0x45,0x01,0x45,0x45} , {3,15}},
{ {0xcd,0x56,0x01,0x7c,0x6f,0xff,0x12,0xe0} , {0x04,0x00,0x08,0x00,0x45,0x01,0x45,0x45} , {4,8}},
{ {0x4b,0x5e,0x0b,0x72,0xef,0xff,0x12,0xe0} , {0x0e,0x06,0x08,0x00,0x45,0x01,0x45,0x45} , {6,14}},
{ {0x00,0x73,0xd8,0x75,0x58,0xff,0x12,0xe0} , {0x0b,0x09,0x0f,0x00,0x45,0x01,0x05,0x45} , {9,5}},
{ {0x0c,0x90,0x32,0xf3,0x5d,0xff,0x12,0xe0} , {0x0d,0x0f,0x0a,0x00,0x45,0x01,0x05,0x45} , {10,13}},
**/
#endif