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proxmark3/common/mbedtls/dhm.c
Philippe Teuwen b1d6eaf2f7 mbedtls: make style
2021-05-14 14:07:59 +02:00

698 lines
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/*
* Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
/*
* The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation
* of the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm:
*
* [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 12
* Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone
*
*/
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
#include "mbedtls/dhm.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define mbedtls_printf printf
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT)
#define DHM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA )
#define DHM_VALIDATE( cond ) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
/*
* helper to validate the mbedtls_mpi size and import it
*/
static int dhm_read_bignum(mbedtls_mpi *X,
unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end) {
int ret, n;
if (end - *p < 2)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
n = ((*p)[0] << 8) | (*p)[1];
(*p) += 2;
if ((int)(end - *p) < n)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(X, *p, n)) != 0)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED + ret);
(*p) += n;
return (0);
}
/*
* Verify sanity of parameter with regards to P
*
* Parameter should be: 2 <= public_param <= P - 2
*
* This means that we need to return an error if
* public_param < 2 or public_param > P-2
*
* For more information on the attack, see:
* http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/psandqs.pdf
* http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2005-2643
*/
static int dhm_check_range(const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P) {
mbedtls_mpi L, U;
int ret = 0;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&U);
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&L, 2));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&U, P, 2));
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(param, &L) < 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(param, &U) > 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&U);
return (ret);
}
void mbedtls_dhm_init(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx) {
DHM_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_dhm_context));
}
/*
* Parse the ServerKeyExchange parameters
*/
int mbedtls_dhm_read_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(p != NULL && *p != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(end != NULL);
if ((ret = dhm_read_bignum(&ctx->P, p, end)) != 0 ||
(ret = dhm_read_bignum(&ctx->G, p, end)) != 0 ||
(ret = dhm_read_bignum(&ctx->GY, p, end)) != 0)
return (ret);
if ((ret = dhm_check_range(&ctx->GY, &ctx->P)) != 0)
return (ret);
ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P);
return (0);
}
/*
* Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters
*/
int mbedtls_dhm_make_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng) {
int ret, count = 0;
size_t n1, n2, n3;
unsigned char *p;
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL);
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) == 0)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
/*
* Generate X as large as possible ( < P )
*/
do {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng));
while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&ctx->X, &ctx->P) >= 0)
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&ctx->X, 1));
if (count++ > 10)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED);
} while (dhm_check_range(&ctx->X, &ctx->P) != 0);
/*
* Calculate GX = G^X mod P
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->GX, &ctx->G, &ctx->X,
&ctx->P, &ctx->RP));
if ((ret = dhm_check_range(&ctx->GX, &ctx->P)) != 0)
return (ret);
/*
* export P, G, GX
*/
#define DHM_MPI_EXPORT( X, n ) \
do { \
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( ( X ), \
p + 2, \
( n ) ) ); \
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( n ) >> 8 ); \
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( n ) ); \
p += ( n ); \
} while( 0 )
n1 = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P);
n2 = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->G);
n3 = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->GX);
p = output;
DHM_MPI_EXPORT(&ctx->P, n1);
DHM_MPI_EXPORT(&ctx->G, n2);
DHM_MPI_EXPORT(&ctx->GX, n3);
*olen = p - output;
ctx->len = n1;
cleanup:
if (ret != 0)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED + ret);
return (0);
}
/*
* Set prime modulus and generator
*/
int mbedtls_dhm_set_group(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_mpi *P,
const mbedtls_mpi *G) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(G != NULL);
if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->P, P)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->G, G)) != 0) {
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED + ret);
}
ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P);
return (0);
}
/*
* Import the peer's public value G^Y
*/
int mbedtls_dhm_read_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL);
if (ilen < 1 || ilen > ctx->len)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->GY, input, ilen)) != 0)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret);
return (0);
}
/*
* Create own private value X and export G^X
*/
int mbedtls_dhm_make_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
unsigned char *output, size_t olen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng) {
int ret, count = 0;
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL);
if (olen < 1 || olen > ctx->len)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) == 0)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
/*
* generate X and calculate GX = G^X mod P
*/
do {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng));
while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&ctx->X, &ctx->P) >= 0)
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&ctx->X, 1));
if (count++ > 10)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED);
} while (dhm_check_range(&ctx->X, &ctx->P) != 0);
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->GX, &ctx->G, &ctx->X,
&ctx->P, &ctx->RP));
if ((ret = dhm_check_range(&ctx->GX, &ctx->P)) != 0)
return (ret);
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->GX, output, olen));
cleanup:
if (ret != 0)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret);
return (0);
}
/*
* Pick a random R in the range [2, M) for blinding purposes
*/
static int dhm_random_below(mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *M,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) {
int ret, count;
count = 0;
do {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(R, mbedtls_mpi_size(M), f_rng, p_rng));
while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(R, M) >= 0)
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(R, 1));
if (count++ > 10)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE);
} while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(R, 1) <= 0);
cleanup:
return (ret);
}
/*
* Use the blinding method and optimisation suggested in section 10 of:
* KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA,
* DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer
* Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113.
*/
static int dhm_update_blinding(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) {
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi R;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&R);
/*
* Don't use any blinding the first time a particular X is used,
* but remember it to use blinding next time.
*/
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&ctx->X, &ctx->pX) != 0) {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->pX, &ctx->X));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ctx->Vi, 1));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ctx->Vf, 1));
return (0);
}
/*
* Ok, we need blinding. Can we re-use existing values?
* If yes, just update them by squaring them.
*/
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Vi, 1) != 0) {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P));
return (0);
}
/*
* We need to generate blinding values from scratch
*/
/* Vi = random( 2, P-1 ) */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(dhm_random_below(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng));
/* Vf = Vi^-X mod P
* First compute Vi^-1 = R * (R Vi)^-1, (avoiding leaks from inv_mod),
* then elevate to the Xth power. */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(dhm_random_below(&R, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vi, &R));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &R));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->X, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP));
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free(&R);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Derive and export the shared secret (G^Y)^X mod P
*/
int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, size_t *olen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_mpi GYb;
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL);
if (output_size < ctx->len)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
if ((ret = dhm_check_range(&ctx->GY, &ctx->P)) != 0)
return (ret);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&GYb);
/* Blind peer's value */
if (f_rng != NULL) {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(dhm_update_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P));
} else
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&GYb, &ctx->GY));
/* Do modular exponentiation */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->K, &GYb, &ctx->X,
&ctx->P, &ctx->RP));
/* Unblind secret value */
if (f_rng != NULL) {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P));
}
*olen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->K);
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->K, output, *olen));
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free(&GYb);
if (ret != 0)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED + ret);
return (0);
}
/*
* Free the components of a DHM key
*/
void mbedtls_dhm_free(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx) {
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->pX);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vf);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vi);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RP);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->K);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->GY);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->GX);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->X);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->G);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->P);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_dhm_context));
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
/*
* Parse DHM parameters
*/
int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin,
size_t dhminlen) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
unsigned char *p, *end;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_pem_context pem;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(dhm != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(dhmin != NULL);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_pem_init(&pem);
/* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */
if (dhminlen == 0 || dhmin[dhminlen - 1] != '\0')
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT;
else
ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem,
"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----",
"-----END DH PARAMETERS-----",
dhmin, NULL, 0, &dhminlen);
if (ret == 0) {
/*
* Was PEM encoded
*/
dhminlen = pem.buflen;
} else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT)
goto exit;
p = (ret == 0) ? pem.buf : (unsigned char *) dhmin;
#else
p = (unsigned char *) dhmin;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
end = p + dhminlen;
/*
* DHParams ::= SEQUENCE {
* prime INTEGER, -- P
* generator INTEGER, -- g
* privateValueLength INTEGER OPTIONAL
* }
*/
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + ret;
goto exit;
}
end = p + len;
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &dhm->P)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &dhm->G)) != 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + ret;
goto exit;
}
if (p != end) {
/* This might be the optional privateValueLength.
* If so, we can cleanly discard it */
mbedtls_mpi rec;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&rec);
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &rec);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&rec);
if (ret != 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + ret;
goto exit;
}
if (p != end) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
goto exit;
}
}
ret = 0;
dhm->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&dhm->P);
exit:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_pem_free(&pem);
#endif
if (ret != 0)
mbedtls_dhm_free(dhm);
return (ret);
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
/*
* Load all data from a file into a given buffer.
*
* The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data.
* A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced
* length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded.
*/
static int load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n) {
FILE *f;
long size;
if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL)
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR);
fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END);
if ((size = ftell(f)) == -1) {
fclose(f);
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR);
}
fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET);
*n = (size_t) size;
if (*n + 1 == 0 ||
(*buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, *n + 1)) == NULL) {
fclose(f);
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED);
}
if (fread(*buf, 1, *n, f) != *n) {
fclose(f);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(*buf, *n + 1);
mbedtls_free(*buf);
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR);
}
fclose(f);
(*buf)[*n] = '\0';
if (strstr((const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN ") != NULL)
++*n;
return (0);
}
/*
* Load and parse DHM parameters
*/
int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
unsigned char *buf;
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(dhm != NULL);
DHM_VALIDATE_RET(path != NULL);
if ((ret = load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0)
return (ret);
ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(dhm, buf, n);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n);
mbedtls_free(buf);
return (ret);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] =
"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n"
"MIGHAoGBAJ419DBEOgmQTzo5qXl5fQcN9TN455wkOL7052HzxxRVMyhYmwQcgJvh\r\n"
"1sa18fyfR9OiVEMYglOpkqVoGLN7qd5aQNNi5W7/C+VBdHTBJcGZJyyP5B3qcz32\r\n"
"9mLJKudlVudV0Qxk5qUJaPZ/xupz0NyoVpviuiBOI1gNi8ovSXWzAgEC\r\n"
"-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n";
#else /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = {
0x30, 0x81, 0x87, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x9e, 0x35, 0xf4, 0x30, 0x44,
0x3a, 0x09, 0x90, 0x4f, 0x3a, 0x39, 0xa9, 0x79, 0x79, 0x7d, 0x07, 0x0d,
0xf5, 0x33, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x9c, 0x24, 0x38, 0xbe, 0xf4, 0xe7, 0x61, 0xf3,
0xc7, 0x14, 0x55, 0x33, 0x28, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x80, 0x9b, 0xe1,
0xd6, 0xc6, 0xb5, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x9f, 0x47, 0xd3, 0xa2, 0x54, 0x43, 0x18,
0x82, 0x53, 0xa9, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x68, 0x18, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xa9, 0xde, 0x5a,
0x40, 0xd3, 0x62, 0xe5, 0x6e, 0xff, 0x0b, 0xe5, 0x41, 0x74, 0x74, 0xc1,
0x25, 0xc1, 0x99, 0x27, 0x2c, 0x8f, 0xe4, 0x1d, 0xea, 0x73, 0x3d, 0xf6,
0xf6, 0x62, 0xc9, 0x2a, 0xe7, 0x65, 0x56, 0xe7, 0x55, 0xd1, 0x0c, 0x64,
0xe6, 0xa5, 0x09, 0x68, 0xf6, 0x7f, 0xc6, 0xea, 0x73, 0xd0, 0xdc, 0xa8,
0x56, 0x9b, 0xe2, 0xba, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x23, 0x58, 0x0d, 0x8b, 0xca, 0x2f,
0x49, 0x75, 0xb3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
static const size_t mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len = sizeof(mbedtls_test_dhm_params);
/*
* Checkup routine
*/
int mbedtls_dhm_self_test(int verbose) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_dhm_context dhm;
mbedtls_dhm_init(&dhm);
if (verbose != 0)
mbedtls_printf(" DHM parameter load: ");
if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(&dhm,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_dhm_params,
mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len)) != 0) {
if (verbose != 0)
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
if (verbose != 0)
mbedtls_printf("passed\n\n");
exit:
mbedtls_dhm_free(&dhm);
return (ret);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */
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