StackExchange/dnscontrol
1
1
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/StackExchange/dnscontrol.git synced 2024-09-20 23:06:23 +08:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
dnscontrol/commands/test_data/example.org.zone
Tom Limoncelli 4edf360854
get-zones output should work as input into preview (#688) 
* Add tests for get-zones
* fix CAA, SSHFP, TLSA and other bugs
* New format for get-zones: "djs" which is js but uses "disco commas"
* Print diffs using github.com/andreyvit/diff

Co-authored-by: Tom Limoncelli <tlimoncelli@stackoverflow.com>
2020-03-10 11:32:47 -04:00

1151 lines
54 KiB
Dns
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters

This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.

; Copyright © 2006-2020 Phil Pennock
; No warranty: if it breaks, you get to cut your hands picking up the shards.
; Permission granted to duplicate in its entirety with authorship preserved,
; or redact as needed for test frameworks, or copy fragments for use in your
; own domains, or pretty much anything else except presenting it as your own
; creation.
$TTL 7200
$ORIGIN example.org.
; This is adapted from a real zonefile.
; All IPs and DNS should be using address-spaces reserved for documentation or
; otherwise available for this usage.
; The original had a /28 routed to an onlink /32 in IPv4, and a /48 for IPv6.
;
; A couple of entries come from a different zone, to round out the examples.
;
; Some information has been redacted, eg Let's Encrypt account numbers.
; Some public keys are the same as they were in the original zone-file, so if
; you have tooling which parses ASN structure or whatever, they should still be
; good.
; If you have a DNS Observatory, you can probably identify the original zone
; through some of these. Good luck!
;
; Some of the IPv6 stuff shows a H:EX encoding scheme; that's real, not
; invented for the example.org redaction. I just changed the prefix.
; {{{ SOA and NS records
example.org. 43200 SOA ns1.example.org. hostmaster.example.org. (
2020030700 ; serial
7200 ; refresh period
3600 ; retry interval
10d ; expire time
7200 ; default/negative TTL
)
NS ns1.example.org.
NS ns2.example.org.
NS ns-a.example.net.
NS friend-dns.example.com.
; }}} SOA and NS records
;;; ======================================================================
; EMAIL FEDERATION {{{
; These are not for clients within our domain.
; These are for sending and receiving email, and telling other mail-systems
; what can send email as us, or claim to be us in HELO, etc.
;
; For SPF: this affects "domains which aren't the domain in question"; we can
; ignore it for our own domains from systems under our control, as the
; mail-server we list here is the one which all mail is channeled through, so
; is what the outside world sees, so is the one listed.
MX 10 mx
TXT "v=spf1 ip4:192.0.2.25 ip6:2001:db8::1:25 mx include:_spf.example.com ~all"
; CSA Priority/Weight/Port;
; Priority for CSA version, so 1
; Weight: 1 unauthorized, 2 authorized, 3 unknown (bit-field)
; Port: assertions: 0 no assertion; 1 subdomains must use CSA
; Target: hostname for which sender IP must be in the RRsets of address records
; Top-level assertion: we list _all_ hostnames which send email out, so EHLO/HELO claiming to be us must be covered here.
; Because almost all mail routes through the mail-hub, we can make this claim; foo is exception
_client._smtp SRV 1 1 1 @
_client._smtp.mx SRV 1 2 1 mx
_client._smtp.foo SRV 1 2 1 foo
; }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Authentication and directory services {{{
; _Service._Proto.Name TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target
_kerberos._tcp SRV 10 1 88 kerb-service
_kerberos._udp SRV 10 1 88 kerb-service
_kpasswd._udp SRV 10 1 464 kerb-service
_kerberos-adm._tcp SRV 10 1 749 kerb-service
_kerberos TXT "EXAMPLE.ORG"
; No LDAP service, and tell people that.
_ldap._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
_ldap._udp SRV 0 0 0 .
; PGP Universal & GnuPG use keys.$domain to find PGP keys, via LDAP
; }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Chat services {{{
; XMPP we divide up the hostnames for federation vs client access.
; Federation on xmpp-s2s, client access on xmpp.
; They are the same host, but we architect to be able to split.
_jabber._tcp SRV 10 2 5269 xmpp-s2s
_xmpp-server._tcp SRV 10 2 5269 xmpp-s2s
_xmpp-client._tcp SRV 10 2 5222 xmpp
; I don't think we need _im._xmpp and _pres._xmpp for a real present server, so
; skip them. If setting up a domain without XMPP, publish `0 0 0 .` for these too.
; _im._xmpp SRV ...
; _pres._xmpp SRV ...
; RFC 3832 "Remote Discovery in SLP via DNS SRV" {exp}: _slpda.{_tcp,_udp}
; RFC 3861: _im.<proto> and _pres.<proto> for IM protocols;
; Instant Messaging SRV Protocol Label registry http://www.iana.org/assignments/im-srv-labels
; Presence SRV Protocol Label registry http://www.iana.org/assignments/pres-srv-labels/pres-srv-labels.xhtml
; So far, both only contain: _xmpp
; Thus _im._xmpp _pres._xmpp
; draft-loreto-simple-im-srv-label-02.txt adds _sip: _im._sip _pres._sip
; RFC 3921: _im._xmpp _pres._xmpp _xmpp._tcp
; SIP SRV: http://www.iana.org/assignments/sip-table
; _sip+d2t._tcp _sips+d2t._tcp _sip+d2u._udp _sip+d2s._sctp _sips+d2s._sctp
; RFC 4386: http://www.iana.org/assignments/pkix-parameters/pkix-parameters.xhtml
; _pkixrep.<proto> -> _ldap _http _ocsp
; Also possibly: _sip _sips _sipfederation _msrps
_im._sip SRV 0 0 0 .
_pres._sip SRV 0 0 0 .
_sip+d2t._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
_sips+d2t._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
_sip+d2u._udp SRV 0 0 0 .
_sip+d2s._sctp SRV 0 0 0 .
_sips+d2s._sctp SRV 0 0 0 .
; }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Email service for use by clients within the domain. {{{
; RFC 6186 (was: draft-daboo-srv-email-05.txt)
; RFC 8314 updates for submissions
; RFC 8314 updates for submissions (obsoletes all cleartext)
; RFC 8552 sets up a registry for all the underscore services and 8553 backfills it
_submission._tcp SRV 10 10 587 smtp
_submissions._tcp SRV 10 10 465 smtp
_imap._tcp SRV 10 10 143 imap
_imaps._tcp SRV 10 10 993 imap
_pop3._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
_pop3s._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
_sieve._tcp SRV 10 10 4190 imap
; }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Other zone-top services {{{
; Where can people send questions or get more information
;;;@ RP hostmaster.example.org. dns-moreinfo.example.org.
dns-moreinfo TXT (
"Fred Bloggs, TZ=America/New_York"
"Chat-Service-X: @handle1"
"Chat-Service-Y: federated-handle@example.org"
)
; SKS withdrawn
_pgpkey-http._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
_pgpkey-https._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
_hkp._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
; WKD <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service/?include_text=1>
; The SRV record should be disappearing because it was removed from the spec.
; In the meantime, point it to the host while being cognizant that GnuPG will
; use the hostname from the target of the SRV for the Host header.
_openpgpkey._tcp SRV 10 10 443 openpgpkey.example.org.
; Not sure anything actually uses this, but ah well
; Avoid pointing at a CNAME, just use barbican directly
_finger._tcp SRV 10 10 79 barbican
; https://wiki.libravatar.org/api/
_avatars-sec._tcp SRV 10 10 443 avatars
; For bare domain as a hostname, we try to avoid it as much as possible.
; Sometimes, it's necessary, eg finger.
; Once it exists in DNS though, HTTP requests will try to hit it when people
; don't type `www.`
; So we point the bare domain at a minimal jail with "not much" in it, and
; use packet filters to redirect the traffic to the correct places.
; For HTTP, we'll issue redirects to avoid this. For finger, we just respond.
@ A 192.0.2.1
@ AAAA 2001:db8::1:1
; }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Email cryptographic authentication {{{
; RFC5585 DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Service Overview
_adsp._domainkey TXT "dkim=all" ; RFC5617 unknown | all | discardable
; http://dmarc.org/draft-dmarc-base-00-01.html DMARC DKIM policy
;
; DMARC: beware that some validators require v/p with no intermediate values,
; which one reading of RFC7489 can support. So keep those together at the front.
_dmarc TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-notify@example.org; ruf=mailto:dmarc-notify@example.org; adkim=s"
; [This is a good place to have a link to documentation on local processes for
; updating DKIM keys]
;
; These are the real current (March 2020) values for the domain which this
; example was drawn from.
; Note that the domain dual-signs email with both RSA and Ed25519 keys.
; The domain also cycles DKIM keys every three months, but it's manual and the
; calendar reminder was missed in February. Oops.
;
d201911._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4SmyE5Tz5/wPL8cb2AKuHnlFeLMOhAl1UX/NYaeDCKMWoBPTgZRT0jonKLmV2UscHdodXu5ZsLr/NAuLCp7HmPLReLz7kxKncP6ppveKxc1aq5SPTKeWe77p6BptlahHc35eiXsZRpTsEzrbEOainy1IWEd+w9p1gWbrSutwE22z0i4V88nQ9UBa1ks" "6cVGxXBZFovWC+i28aGs6Lc7cSfHG5+Mrg3ud5X4evYXTGFMPpunMcCsXrqmS5a+5gRSEMZhngha/cHjLwaJnWzKaywNWF5XOsCjL94QkS0joB7lnGOHMNSZBCcu542Y3Ht3SgHhlpkF9mIbIRfpzA9IoSQIDAQAB"
d201911e2._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=GBt2k2L39KUb39fg5brOppXDHXvISy0+ECGgPld/bIo="
;
d202003._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv/1tQvOEs7xtKNm7PbPgY4hQjwHVvqqkDb0+TeqZHYRSczQ3c0LFJrIDFiPIdwQe/7AuKrxvATSh/uXKZ3EP4ouMgROPZnUxVXENeetJj+pc3nfGwTKUBTTTth+SO74gdIWsntjvAfduzosC4ZkxbDwZ9c253qXARGvGu+LB/iAeq0ngEbm5fU13+Jo" "pv0d4dR6oGe9GvMEnGGLZzNrxWl1BPe2x5JZ5/X/3fW8vJx3OgRB5N6fqbAJ6HZ9kcbikDH4lPPl9RIoprFk7mmwno/nXLQYGhPobmqq8wLkDiXEkWtYa5lzujz3XI3Zkk8ZIOGvdbVVfAttT0IVPnYkOhQIDAQAB"
d202003e2._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=DQI5d9sNMrr0SLDoAi071IFOyKnlbR29hAQdqVQecQg="
;
; http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-marf-reporting-discovery-01
_report TXT "r=abuse-reports@example.org; rf=ARF; re=postmaster@example.org;"
; These are for RFC8460 and the sender needs to support MTA-STS or DANE; if
; they only support one, we might get error complaints.
; SMTP TLS Reporting used `_smtp-tlsrpt` in <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-uta-smtp-tlsrpt-17>
; but `_smtp._tls` by the time RFC 8460 was published.
_smtp._tls TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:smtp-tls-reports@example.org"
_smtp-tlsrpt TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:smtp-tls-reports@example.org"
; RFC 7489 § 7.1
; Any domains which point their DMARC records to email in this domain need
; to be authorized by having a record here, saying "yes, it's known, go ahead
; and send their DMARC reports to us."
;
; This is not needed for our sub-domains, because they're the same
; "organizational domain" as us (organizational domain is the thing which is
; publicly registered, ie where the parent domain is in the public suffix
; list).
;
$ORIGIN _report._dmarc.example.org.
example.net TXT "v=DMARC1"
example.com TXT "v=DMARC1"
xn--2j5b.xn--9t4b11yi5a TXT "v=DMARC1"
special.test TXT "v=DMARC1"
xn--qck5b9a5eml3bze.xn--zckzah TXT "v=DMARC1"
$ORIGIN example.org.
; https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dane-smime/?include_text=1
; Using Secure DNS to Associate Certificates with Domain Names For S/MIME
; draft-ietf-dane-smime-15
*._smimecert CNAME _ourca-smimea
; Whatever the LHS, it all uses the one set of CAs, mine, which is ECC.
; }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Zeroconf Delegation {{{
; Point clients at a sub-domain for Wide Area Bonjour
; "b" = browse domain
; "lb" = legacy browse domain (include domain in empty-string browses)
; "r" = registration domain
b._dns-sd._udp PTR field
lb._dns-sd._udp PTR field
r._dns-sd._udp PTR field
field NS ns1.example.org.
NS ns2.example.org.
;;;field DS 50664 7 1 8AA19AF49BFBAE7103E3450FB19E7C4B88FA556A
;;;field DS 50664 7 2 D4EEDAE5EC46C3C1A3A6DC6BC4404F36BA00E4025562A9BC8F3261A9 D0F08F96
; }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Hosts and SSH Fingerprints {{{
; SSH fingerprints
; RFC4255 Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints
; RFC6594 Use of the SHA-256 Algorithm with RSA, Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), and Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) in SSHFP Resource Records
; http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sshfp-rr-parameters/dns-sshfp-rr-parameters.xml
;
; On a host with a suitably up-to-date ssh-keygen, using the .pub files:
; ssh-keygen -r $hostname -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_$type_key.pub
;
; Records are: SSHFP ${keytype_alg} ${hash_alg} ${hash_data}
; keytype_alg: 1/RSA 2/DSA 3/ECDSA 4/Ed25519 6/Ed448
; hash_alg: 1/SHA-1 2/SHA-256
;
;nb: SSH DSA currently constrained to 1024-bit, far too short, so dropping alg=2 from DNS
;nb: SHA-1 is dead, let's stop publishing it.
; barbican: perimeter defense {{{
; barbican runs perimeter general services, such as recursive DNS
; This is also the IP address used for NAT/RDR for private jails
; This is also now @ for example.org too.
; Deliberately no SSH here.
barbican A 192.0.2.1
barbican AAAA 2001:db8::1:1
barbican.ipv4 A 192.0.2.1
barbican.ipv6 AAAA 2001:db8::1:1
; }}}
; megalomaniac: Onlink-address for main Colo box {{{
megalomaniac A 198.51.100.254
AAAA 2001:db8:ffef::254
megalomaniac.ipv4 A 198.51.100.254
megalomaniac.ipv6 AAAA 2001:db8:ffef::254
megalomaniac SSHFP 1 2 4e9ced94d3caf2ce915f85a63ce7279d5118a79ea03dac59cf4859b825d2f619
megalomaniac SSHFP 3 2 d3556a3db83ab9ccec39dc6693dd2f3e28b178c9bba61880924821c426cc61eb
megalomaniac SSHFP 4 2 c60c9d9d4728668f5f46986ff0c5b416c5e913862c4970cbfe211a6f44a111b4
megalomaniac.ipv4 SSHFP 1 2 4e9ced94d3caf2ce915f85a63ce7279d5118a79ea03dac59cf4859b825d2f619
megalomaniac.ipv4 SSHFP 3 2 d3556a3db83ab9ccec39dc6693dd2f3e28b178c9bba61880924821c426cc61eb
megalomaniac.ipv4 SSHFP 4 2 c60c9d9d4728668f5f46986ff0c5b416c5e913862c4970cbfe211a6f44a111b4
megalomaniac.ipv6 SSHFP 1 2 4e9ced94d3caf2ce915f85a63ce7279d5118a79ea03dac59cf4859b825d2f619
megalomaniac.ipv6 SSHFP 3 2 d3556a3db83ab9ccec39dc6693dd2f3e28b178c9bba61880924821c426cc61eb
megalomaniac.ipv6 SSHFP 4 2 c60c9d9d4728668f5f46986ff0c5b416c5e913862c4970cbfe211a6f44a111b4
; }}}
; tower is the main login jail {{{
tower A 192.0.2.42
tower AAAA 2001:db8::1:42
tower.ipv4 A 192.0.2.42
tower.ipv6 AAAA 2001:db8::1:42
tower SSHFP 1 2 0f211d236e94768911a294f38653c4af6fa935a5b06c975d8162f59142571451
tower SSHFP 3 2 88bf7b7401c11fa2e84871efb06cd73d8fc409154605b354db2dda0b82fe1160
tower SSHFP 4 2 6d30900be0faaae73568fc007a87b4d076cf9a351ecacc1106aef726c34ad61d
tower.ipv4 SSHFP 1 2 0f211d236e94768911a294f38653c4af6fa935a5b06c975d8162f59142571451
tower.ipv4 SSHFP 3 2 88bf7b7401c11fa2e84871efb06cd73d8fc409154605b354db2dda0b82fe1160
tower.ipv4 SSHFP 4 2 6d30900be0faaae73568fc007a87b4d076cf9a351ecacc1106aef726c34ad61d
tower.ipv6 SSHFP 1 2 0f211d236e94768911a294f38653c4af6fa935a5b06c975d8162f59142571451
tower.ipv6 SSHFP 3 2 88bf7b7401c11fa2e84871efb06cd73d8fc409154605b354db2dda0b82fe1160
tower.ipv6 SSHFP 4 2 6d30900be0faaae73568fc007a87b4d076cf9a351ecacc1106aef726c34ad61d
; }}}
; vcs for svn and git {{{
vcs A 192.0.2.228
vcs AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:4456:4353
vcs.ipv4 A 192.0.2.228
vcs.ipv6 AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:4456:4353
git CNAME vcs
git.ipv4 CNAME vcs.ipv4
git.ipv6 CNAME vcs.ipv6
; svn is kerberized so has its own hostname and is only IPv6-accessible because
; we don't have IPv4 to spare for this.
svn AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:73:766e
vcs SSHFP 1 2 b518be390babdf43cb2d598aa6befa6ce6878546bf107b829d0cfc65253a97d4
vcs SSHFP 3 2 e92545dc0bf501f72333ddeb7a37afc2c5b408ce39a3ad95fbc66236f0077323
vcs SSHFP 4 2 02289441124a487095a6cda2e946c6a8ed9087faf3592ec4135536c3e615521c
vcs.ipv4 SSHFP 1 2 b518be390babdf43cb2d598aa6befa6ce6878546bf107b829d0cfc65253a97d4
vcs.ipv4 SSHFP 3 2 e92545dc0bf501f72333ddeb7a37afc2c5b408ce39a3ad95fbc66236f0077323
vcs.ipv4 SSHFP 4 2 02289441124a487095a6cda2e946c6a8ed9087faf3592ec4135536c3e615521c
vcs.ipv6 SSHFP 1 2 b518be390babdf43cb2d598aa6befa6ce6878546bf107b829d0cfc65253a97d4
vcs.ipv6 SSHFP 3 2 e92545dc0bf501f72333ddeb7a37afc2c5b408ce39a3ad95fbc66236f0077323
vcs.ipv6 SSHFP 4 2 02289441124a487095a6cda2e946c6a8ed9087faf3592ec4135536c3e615521c
; }}}
; nsauth is the authoritative DNS server {{{
nsauth A 192.0.2.53
nsauth AAAA 2001:db8::53:1
nsauth.ipv4 A 192.0.2.53
nsauth.ipv6 AAAA 2001:db8::53:1
nsauth SSHFP 1 2 895804ae022fff643b2677563cb850607c5bb564d9919896c521098c8abc40f2
nsauth SSHFP 3 2 28a65470badae611375747e1a803211c41e3d71e97741fa92ccbdf7b01f34e42
nsauth SSHFP 4 2 6e10445c0649c03fa83e18b1873e5b89b3a20893ecb48d01e7cedb3dd563ecf0
nsauth.ipv4 SSHFP 1 2 895804ae022fff643b2677563cb850607c5bb564d9919896c521098c8abc40f2
nsauth.ipv4 SSHFP 3 2 28a65470badae611375747e1a803211c41e3d71e97741fa92ccbdf7b01f34e42
nsauth.ipv4 SSHFP 4 2 6e10445c0649c03fa83e18b1873e5b89b3a20893ecb48d01e7cedb3dd563ecf0
nsauth.ipv6 SSHFP 1 2 895804ae022fff643b2677563cb850607c5bb564d9919896c521098c8abc40f2
nsauth.ipv6 SSHFP 3 2 28a65470badae611375747e1a803211c41e3d71e97741fa92ccbdf7b01f34e42
nsauth.ipv6 SSHFP 4 2 6e10445c0649c03fa83e18b1873e5b89b3a20893ecb48d01e7cedb3dd563ecf0
; These are the entries which appear in glue
ns1 A 192.0.2.53
ns1 AAAA 2001:db8::53:1
ns2 A 203.0.113.53
ns2 AAAA 2001:db8:113::53
; }}}
; hermes for mail {{{
; The raw IPv6 for this match the SMTP and IMAP _submission_ aliases
; for various reasons, but not the MX IPv6 (which also goes there).
hermes A 192.0.2.25
hermes AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:736d:7470
hermes AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:696d:6170
hermes.ipv4 A 192.0.2.25
hermes.ipv6 AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:736d:7470
hermes.ipv6 AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:696d:6170
hermes SSHFP 1 2 4472ff5bd0528cd49216af4503ba6a1c48f121d0292a31d6af193e5000af4966
hermes SSHFP 3 2 eaba20c1565676a5229184ccfcf82d0ee408f91757a67d9fa51a0b6f3db4a33b
hermes SSHFP 4 2 a9d89920e599d04363c8b35a4ce66c1ed257ea1d16981f060b6aed080bbb7a7c
hermes.ipv4 SSHFP 1 2 4472ff5bd0528cd49216af4503ba6a1c48f121d0292a31d6af193e5000af4966
hermes.ipv4 SSHFP 3 2 eaba20c1565676a5229184ccfcf82d0ee408f91757a67d9fa51a0b6f3db4a33b
hermes.ipv4 SSHFP 4 2 a9d89920e599d04363c8b35a4ce66c1ed257ea1d16981f060b6aed080bbb7a7c
hermes.ipv6 SSHFP 1 2 4472ff5bd0528cd49216af4503ba6a1c48f121d0292a31d6af193e5000af4966
hermes.ipv6 SSHFP 3 2 eaba20c1565676a5229184ccfcf82d0ee408f91757a67d9fa51a0b6f3db4a33b
hermes.ipv6 SSHFP 4 2 a9d89920e599d04363c8b35a4ce66c1ed257ea1d16981f060b6aed080bbb7a7c
; }}}
; other top-level base service hostnames (no SSH) {{{
; other IPv4 and IPv6 is routed to unredoubted and then configured up locally
kerb-service A 192.0.2.88
kerb-service AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:6b65:7262
security A 192.0.2.92
security AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:53:4543
security.ipv4 A 192.0.2.92
security.ipv6 AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:53:4543
services A 192.0.2.93
services AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:5345:5256
services.ipv4 A 192.0.2.93
services.ipv6 AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:5345:5256
; }}}
; CNAMEs and things we wish were ALIAS or auto-made: {{{
; https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-07.txt
; (thru -06 it was SRV records); this is constructed from the email address,
; so we don't need .ipvX variants.
; I don't want CNAME as target of SRV; so grep-bait: CNAME security
openpgpkey A 192.0.2.92
openpgpkey AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:53:4543
finger CNAME barbican
finger.ipv4 CNAME barbican.ipv4
finger.ipv6 CNAME barbican.ipv6
; avatars can't be a CNAME and the target of an SRV.
; greb-bait: CNAME services
avatars A 192.0.2.93
AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:5345:5256
dict CNAME services
people CNAME services
people.ipv4 CNAME services.ipv4
people.ipv6 CNAME services.ipv6
wpad CNAME services
www CNAME services
www.ipv4 CNAME services.ipv4
www.ipv6 CNAME services.ipv6
; }}}
; Hosts and SSH Fingerprints }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Zone Identity Services {{{
; CAA: originally:RFC 6844 ; currently: RFC 8659, with extensions in RFC 8657
;
; issue/issuewild tags use values which are "rest of data" (not Strings, no 255
; limit) and which are a domain name, followed optionally by parameters, each
; individual parameter preceded by a `;` semi-colon; parameters are defined
; per-Issuer. A missing domain-name is allowed, no parameters defined for that
; case.
;
; Even though RFC 8659 says "The semantics of parameters to the issue Property
; Tag are determined by the Issuer alone.", RFC 8657 proceeds to define
; semantics for some parameters. I think this is more "if folks do stick to
; one common schema then it's easier for others to build tools, but still each
; Issuer can set their own meanings and ignore this if they really want".
; This is backed by 8657 IANA Considerations.
; But then 8657 then imposes MUST requirements upon ACME-using systems.
;
; RFC 8657 adds: `accounturi`, `validationmethods`; can repeat the CAA record
; with the same domain but a different accounturi each time.
; https://docs.aws.amazon.com/acm/latest/userguide/setup-caa.html
; Any of: "amazon.com" "amazontrust.com" "awstrust.com" "amazonaws.com"
; No info re RFC8657 as of 2019-12-31
;
; https://letsencrypt.org/docs/caa/
; "Let’s Encrypt’s identifying domain name for CAA is letsencrypt.org. This is officially documented in our Certification Practice Statement (CPS), section 4.2.1."
; https://letsencrypt.org/documents/isrg-cps-v2.0/
; ISRG checks for relevant CAA records prior to issuing certificates. The CA acts in accordance with CAA records if present. The CA’s CAA identifying domain is ‘letsencrypt.org’.
; 2019-12-31: can find no docs re accounturi, but community forum posts
; showing that the account from the ACME client data works (after a bug was
; fixed re ACMEv2 URLs)
;
; https://www.digicert.com/dns-caa-rr-check.htm
; Equivalent: "digicert.com" "www.digicert.com" "digicert.ne.jp" "cybertrust.ne.jp" "symantec.com" "thawte.com" "geotrust.com" "rapidssl.com"
; 2019-12-31: no accounturi docs
;
; https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/ccadb/AllCAAIdentifiersReport
; HTML page, all CAA identifiers known to the Common CA Database; <https://www.ccadb.org/resources>
; 2019-12-31: I am not using Amazon inside example.org domain; that's on the blog at bridge.example.com
; <https://crt.sh/?q=%25.example.org> only lists LE.
; Beware that our LetsEncrypt automation tooling uses multiple email addresses
; for different purposes, but all hostnames within example.org are using the
; noc@example.org address, so that's the only one we need.
; Let's Encrypt:
; Prod/1234567 == tower / noc@example.org
; Stag/23456789 = chat2 / noc+chat2@example.net
; Prod/76543210 = chat2 / noc+chat2@example.net
@ CAA 0 issue "example.net"
@ CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org\; accounturi=https://acme-v01.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/reg/1234567"
@ CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org\; accounturi=https://acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/acct/23456789"
@ CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org\; accounturi=https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/acct/76543210"
;@ CAA 0 issue "amazonaws.com"
@ CAA 0 issuewild ";"
@ CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@example.org"
; Zone Identity Services }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; TLSA Records {{{
; TLSA: Usage Selector Matching-Type CAdata
; Usage==2 : CA anchor, no PKIX requirement
; Selector==0 : match entire cert
; Selector==1 : match public key
; MT: 0=exact match, 1=sha256, 2=sha512
; RFCs: 6698 6394
; Naming from RFC 7218 (draft-ietf-dane-registry-acronyms-03.txt):
; * Usages: PKIX-TA(0) PKIX-EE(1) DANE-TA(2) DANE-EE(3) PrivCert(255)
; * Selectors: Cert(0) SPKI(1) PrivSel(255)
; * Matching Types: Full(0) SHA2-256(1) SHA2-512(2) PrivMatch(255)
; We don't use -example-tlsa-full any more; that was our v3 CA, and in the meantime
; the client tooling for TLSA has matured and we can use better matching.
;
; _example-tlsa-full TLSA ( 2 0 0 30.... ) ; OurCA3 PKIX-less trust anchor
;
; openssl x509 -inform pem -outform der -in OurCA3.pem| perl -pe 's/(.)/sprintf "%02x", ord $1/aesg';echo
; openssl x509 -inform pem -outform der -in OurCA3.pem| perl -pe 's/(.)/sprintf "%02x", ord $1/aesg' | perl -pe 's/(.{72})/$1\n/g';echo
; For our own CAs, we use Selector 0 to match the entire cert, because we
; control the horizontal and the vertical.
; For CAs we use, we use Selector 1, so that if they reissue their signing cert
; then our DNS records remain valid: as long the as public key is unchanged,
; the 2/1/1 will be unchanged too.
;
; We typically avoid 3/x/x for individual certs or public keys directly in DNS:
; we don't want to have to update a static zonefile for cert re-issuance, and
; even with a dynamic zonefile, any complicated pre-issuance schemes or timing
; dances to deal with DNS TTLs fall down when there's an emergency revocation
; or replacement. Just pin the issuing CA with 2/x/x and be done with it.
; OurCA {{{
_ourcaca4-tlsa TLSA ( ; OurCA4 PKIX-less trust anchor
02 00 01 ea99063a0a3bda9727032cf82da238698b90ba729300703d3956943635f96488
; TLSA DANE-TA CERT SHA2-256
)
; danetool --tlsa-rr --host=foo --ca --x509 --load-certificate=OurCA4.pem
_ourcaca5-tlsa TLSA ( ; OurCA5 PKIX-less trust anchor
02 00 01 11f058f61f97b8adc66ef4801f918c71b10e5c1e3d39afde10408b3026647ef1
; TLSA DANE-TA CERT SHA2-256
)
; danetool --tlsa-rr --host=foo --ca --x509 --load-certificate=OurCA5.pem
; SMIMEA {{{
; Note that the SMIME email signatures include the CA usually; mutt certainly does,
; so folks getting signed email from me _have_ the CA. So no need to use 2/0/0 here.
;
; That _was_:
; openssl x509 -inform pem -outform der -in OurCA5.pem | perl -pe 's/(.)/sprintf "%02x", ord $1/aesg' | perl -pe 's/(.{72})/$1\n/g';echo
;
; but instead we can just use the signatures.
; Since it's just an X.509 cert and almost the same as a TLSA record, use danetool.
; Heck, copy the _ourcaca5-tlsa RRset and change the RRtypes.
;;;_ourcaca5-smimea SMIMEA ( ; OurCA5 PKIX-less trust anchor
;;; 02 00 01 11f058f61f97b8adc66ef4801f918c71b10e5c1e3d39afde10408b3026647ef1
;;; ; SMIMEA DANE-TA CERT SHA2-256
;;; )
; danetool --tlsa-rr --host=foo --ca --x509 --load-certificate=OurCA5.pem
; This one should be a _set_ of CAs, letting me add OurCA6 (Ed25519) when the time comes.
;;;_ourca-smimea SMIMEA ( ; OurCA5 PKIX-less trust anchor
;;; 02 00 01 11f058f61f97b8adc66ef4801f918c71b10e5c1e3d39afde10408b3026647ef1
;;; ; SMIMEA DANE-TA CERT SHA2-256
;;; )
; OurCA }}}
; SMIMEA }}}
; Other CAs, standalone {{{
_cacert-c3-tlsa TLSA ( ; CACert Class 3 PKIX-less trust anchor
02 00 01 4edde9e55ca453b388887caa25d5c5c5bccf2891d73b87495808293d5fac83c8
; TLSA DANE-TA CERT SHA2-256
)
; danetool --tlsa-rr --host=foo --ca --x509 --load-certificate=cacert-class3.pem
; For Let's Encrypt, where they have multiple signing paths, we use public-key
; hashing, not certificate hashing.
; This avoids breakage given, eg, IdenTrust vs other authority paths
;
;_letsencrypt-tlsa TLSA ( 02 01 01 0b9fa5a59eed715c26c1020c711b4f6ec42d58b0015e14337a39dad301c5afc3 ) ; ISRG Root X1
_letsencrypt-tlsa TLSA ( 02 01 01 60b87575447dcba2a36b7d11ac09fb24a9db406fee12d2cc90180517616e8a18 ) ; X1 & X3
_letsencrypt-tlsa TLSA ( 02 01 01 b111dd8a1c2091a89bd4fd60c57f0716cce50feeff8137cdbee0326e02cf362b ) ; X2 & X4
; danetool --tlsa-rr --host=foo --ca --load-certificate=letsencrypt_rsa_authority_x1.pem
; edit results of: for F in AmazonRootCA*; danetool --tlsa-rr --host=$F --ca --x509 --load-certificate=$F
_amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 8ecde6884f3d87b1125ba31ac3fcb13d7016de7f57cc904fe1cb97c6ae98196e ) ; AmazonRootCA1
_amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 1ba5b2aa8c65401a82960118f80bec4f62304d83cec4713a19c39c011ea46db4 ) ; AmazonRootCA2
_amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 18ce6cfe7bf14e60b2e347b8dfe868cb31d02ebb3ada271569f50343b46db3a4 ) ; AmazonRootCA3
_amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 e35d28419ed02025cfa69038cd623962458da5c695fbdea3c22b0bfb25897092 ) ; AmazonRootCA4
; Other CAs, standalone }}}
; Combined CA TLSA records {{{
; These let us migrate between CAs without any outage, or have contingency plans.
; _ourca-tlsa is a pairing anchor, handling both CA4 and CA5.
_ourca-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 ea99063a0a3bda9727032cf82da238698b90ba729300703d3956943635f96488 ) ; OurCA4
_ourca-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 11f058f61f97b8adc66ef4801f918c71b10e5c1e3d39afde10408b3026647ef1 ) ; OurCA5
; Used for migrations CACert -> OurCA4
_ourca-cacert-tlsa TLSA 02 00 01 ea99063a0a3bda9727032cf82da238698b90ba729300703d3956943635f96488 ; OurCA4
_ourca-cacert-tlsa TLSA 02 00 01 11f058f61f97b8adc66ef4801f918c71b10e5c1e3d39afde10408b3026647ef1 ; OurCA5
_ourca-cacert-tlsa TLSA 02 00 01 4edde9e55ca453b388887caa25d5c5c5bccf2891d73b87495808293d5fac83c8 ; cacert-c3
; This mostly means "stuff which used to be on our own CA but for which we now use Let's Encrypt because others might see it"
_ourca-le-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 ea99063a0a3bda9727032cf82da238698b90ba729300703d3956943635f96488 ) ; OurCA4
_ourca-le-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 11f058f61f97b8adc66ef4801f918c71b10e5c1e3d39afde10408b3026647ef1 ) ; OurCA5
_ourca-le-tlsa TLSA ( 02 01 01 60b87575447dcba2a36b7d11ac09fb24a9db406fee12d2cc90180517616e8a18 ) ; letsencrypt X1 & X3
_ourca-le-tlsa TLSA ( 02 01 01 b111dd8a1c2091a89bd4fd60c57f0716cce50feeff8137cdbee0326e02cf362b ) ; letsencrypt X2 & X4
; Don't ask
_ourca-cacert-le-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 ea99063a0a3bda9727032cf82da238698b90ba729300703d3956943635f96488 ) ; OurCA4
_ourca-cacert-le-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 11f058f61f97b8adc66ef4801f918c71b10e5c1e3d39afde10408b3026647ef1 ) ; OurCA5
_ourca-cacert-le-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 4edde9e55ca453b388887caa25d5c5c5bccf2891d73b87495808293d5fac83c8 ) ; cacert-c3
_ourca-cacert-le-tlsa TLSA ( 02 01 01 60b87575447dcba2a36b7d11ac09fb24a9db406fee12d2cc90180517616e8a18 ) ; letsencrypt X1 & X3
_ourca-cacert-le-tlsa TLSA ( 02 01 01 b111dd8a1c2091a89bd4fd60c57f0716cce50feeff8137cdbee0326e02cf362b ) ; letsencrypt X2 & X4
; Stuff we migrate from CACert to Let's Encrypt; was never private CA, we
; always wanted others to be able to validate.
_cacert-le-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 4edde9e55ca453b388887caa25d5c5c5bccf2891d73b87495808293d5fac83c8 ) ; cacert-c3
_cacert-le-tlsa TLSA ( 02 01 01 60b87575447dcba2a36b7d11ac09fb24a9db406fee12d2cc90180517616e8a18 ) ; letsencrypt X1 & X3
_cacert-le-tlsa TLSA ( 02 01 01 b111dd8a1c2091a89bd4fd60c57f0716cce50feeff8137cdbee0326e02cf362b ) ; letsencrypt X2 & X4
; Some stuff we move between LE and AWS CloudFront in front of an S3 bucket
_le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 01 01 60b87575447dcba2a36b7d11ac09fb24a9db406fee12d2cc90180517616e8a18 ) ; letsencrypt X1 & X3
_le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 01 01 b111dd8a1c2091a89bd4fd60c57f0716cce50feeff8137cdbee0326e02cf362b ) ; letsencrypt X2 & X4
_le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 8ecde6884f3d87b1125ba31ac3fcb13d7016de7f57cc904fe1cb97c6ae98196e ) ; AmazonRootCA1
_le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 1ba5b2aa8c65401a82960118f80bec4f62304d83cec4713a19c39c011ea46db4 ) ; AmazonRootCA2
_le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 18ce6cfe7bf14e60b2e347b8dfe868cb31d02ebb3ada271569f50343b46db3a4 ) ; AmazonRootCA3
_le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 e35d28419ed02025cfa69038cd623962458da5c695fbdea3c22b0bfb25897092 ) ; AmazonRootCA4
; All The Current Bases
_ourca-le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 ea99063a0a3bda9727032cf82da238698b90ba729300703d3956943635f96488 ) ; OurCA4
_ourca-le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 11f058f61f97b8adc66ef4801f918c71b10e5c1e3d39afde10408b3026647ef1 ) ; OurCA5
_ourca-le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 01 01 60b87575447dcba2a36b7d11ac09fb24a9db406fee12d2cc90180517616e8a18 ) ; letsencrypt X1 & X3
_ourca-le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 01 01 b111dd8a1c2091a89bd4fd60c57f0716cce50feeff8137cdbee0326e02cf362b ) ; letsencrypt X2 & X4
_ourca-le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 8ecde6884f3d87b1125ba31ac3fcb13d7016de7f57cc904fe1cb97c6ae98196e ) ; AmazonRootCA1
_ourca-le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 1ba5b2aa8c65401a82960118f80bec4f62304d83cec4713a19c39c011ea46db4 ) ; AmazonRootCA2
_ourca-le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 18ce6cfe7bf14e60b2e347b8dfe868cb31d02ebb3ada271569f50343b46db3a4 ) ; AmazonRootCA3
_ourca-le-amazon-tlsa TLSA ( 02 00 01 e35d28419ed02025cfa69038cd623962458da5c695fbdea3c22b0bfb25897092 ) ; AmazonRootCA4
; Combined CA TLSA records }}}
; TLSA Records }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; TLSA Referencing {{{
; full:
; openssl x509 -inform pem -outform der -in OurCA3.pem| perl -pe 's/(.)/sprintf "%02x", ord $1/aesg' | perl -pe 's/(.{72})/$1\n/g';echo
; short:
; danetool --tlsa-rr --host=foo --ca --x509 --load-certificate=some-company.classN.server.shaN.ca.pem
; Web and other HTTP Transport
_443._tcp.www CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_443._tcp.www.ipv4 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_443._tcp.www.ipv6 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_443._tcp.people CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_443._tcp.people.ipv4 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_443._tcp.people.ipv6 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_443._tcp.git CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_443._tcp.svn CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
; XMPP / Jabber
_5222._tcp.xmpp CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_5223._tcp.xmpp CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_5269._tcp.xmpp-s2s CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
; Email
_25._tcp.mx CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_26._tcp.mx CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_27._tcp.mx CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
; the ....46 are the SRV results, the non-46 may be manually configured
; the 1xxx are for potential debugging
; there's too much historical cruft here, from when I had one IPv4 address and
; a bazillion IPv6 addresses.
_465._tcp.smtp46 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_587._tcp.smtp46 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_1465._tcp.smtp46 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_1587._tcp.smtp46 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_465._tcp.smtp CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_587._tcp.smtp CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_1465._tcp.smtp CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_1587._tcp.smtp CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_143._tcp.imap46 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_993._tcp.imap46 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_143._tcp.imap CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_993._tcp.imap CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
; except for sieve, where there's only IPv6
_4190._tcp.imap CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
;
www.security CNAME security
www.security.ipv4 CNAME security.ipv4
www.security.ipv6 CNAME security.ipv6
_443._tcp.www.security CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_443._tcp.www.security.ipv4 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_443._tcp.www.security.ipv6 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_443._tcp.security CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_443._tcp.security.ipv4 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
_443._tcp.security.ipv6 CNAME _ourca-le-tlsa
; _acme-challenge.www.security.example.org. 120 TXT "..."
; _acme-challenge.security.example.org. 120 TXT "..."
; beware SAN : one each
; rather low TTL because some things might be using this as their backoff determination, buggily.
;
; This does require that the ACME client correctly remap domains to update in
; DNS before asking for a validation of the unmapped domain. The tool I used
; in 2020-02 claimed such support but it was buggy and I had to abandon this
; approach. Instead, we have the nginx vhost which handles a bare
; "example.org" handle /.well-known/acme-challenge/ by trying local files
; first, else HTTP proxying to the chat server.
; I'd like to get rid of that proxying and switch back to DNS updating;
; "d.example.net" is delegated to a commercial service which has an API with
; near-instant live updates.
_acme-challenge 15 CNAME _acme-challenge.chat-acme.d.example.net.
_acme-challenge.xmpp 15 CNAME _acme-challenge.xmpp.chat-acme.d.example.net.
_acme-challenge.chat 15 CNAME _acme-challenge.chat.chat-acme.d.example.net.
_acme-challenge.conference 15 CNAME _acme-challenge.conference.chat-acme.d.example.net.
_acme-challenge.proxy-chatfiles 15 CNAME _acme-challenge.proxy-chatfiles.chat-acme.d.example.net.
_acme-challenge.pubsub.xmpp 15 CNAME _acme-challenge.pubsub.xmpp.chat-acme.d.example.net.
; TLSA Referencing }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Mail server hostnames {{{
; Willing to sacrifice Kerberos portability and rely upon disabling reverse DNS
; hostname canonicalization. Sucking it up. Still no reliable IPv6 at home.
; :(
; For /etc/krb5.conf: [libdefaults] dns_canonicalize_hostname = false
;
imap AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:696d:6170
A 192.0.2.25
smtp AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:736d:7470
A 192.0.2.25
;
smtp46 A 192.0.2.25 ; old alias pre-dating IPv4 in smtp
AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:736d:7470
imap46 A 192.0.2.25 ; old alias pre-dating IPv4 in imap
AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:696d:6170
; If changing this, then also update the SPF record; it hard-codes these for
; efficiency of remote systems, saving them some lookups.
; Really, we should be constructing the SPF record via a macro of some kind.
; I'm trying to avoid using M4 to make this zonefile, but sometimes with some
; good whiskey, that looks mighty tempting.
mx A 192.0.2.25
AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:736d:7470
mx.ipv4 A 192.0.2.25
mx.ipv6 AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:736d:7470
;
; RFC 7208 section 10.1.3
; HELO hostnames need to have SPF to allow processing for bounces
; In short: there is no envelope sender for bounces, so the only thing which
; can be checked in the HELO name.
;
; This needs to be tied to the exim.conf setup for outbound `helo_data` on
; transports. At this time, that's "mx.example.org"; this needs to also
; match the `interface` IP address list.
; We do not need to allow other email service providers to claim to be this
; host, so we use "a" (for A/AAAA matching), a catchall for our IPs, and a
; *hard* reject on any other IP.
; Because we never send email from mx.example.org and it's only used by HELO
; checks, we can be firm and not have to worry about forwarding or other
; legitimate shenanigans.
mx TXT "v=spf1 a include:_spflarge.example.net -all"
; RFC 8461 SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS)
; Final: `_mta-sts` TXT record, `v=STSv1`, with host records on `mta-sts`:
; https://mta-sts.example.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
;
;; History:
;;; https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-02
;;; SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS)
;;; Draft -03 renames to "mta-sts", to match the hostname which has to resolve anyway,
;;; which makes sense: NXDOMAIN can skip a second lookup.
;;; https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-03
;;; NB: draft -15 in now in last call, and by this point:
;;; + it's .txt, not .json
;;; + the allowed fields for the mode have changed (`report` -> `testing`)
;;; + DNS is back to _mta-sts
;
; IP addresses should match `services`; this is ALIAS record stuff, can't use
; CNAME because need TXT record too, for the draft, but can switch back to CNAME
; if ignoring the draft.
;
; If updating version, don't forget to check globnix.org DNS too!
_mta-sts TXT "v=STSv1; id=20191231r1;"
mta-sts TXT "v=STSv1; id=20191231r1;"
mta-sts A 192.0.2.93
mta-sts AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:5345:5256
; Mail server hostnames }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Chat server hostnames {{{
; $HostingProvider chat2.example.net
; ipv4: 203.0.113.175
; ipv6: 2001:db8::f0ab:cdef:1234:f00f
;
xmpp.ipv6 AAAA 2001:db8::f0ab:cdef:1234:f00f
xmpp-s2s.ipv6 AAAA 2001:db8::f0ab:cdef:1234:f00f
xmpp A 203.0.113.175
AAAA 2001:db8::f0ab:cdef:1234:f00f
xmpp-s2s A 203.0.113.175
AAAA 2001:db8::f0ab:cdef:1234:f00f
proxy-chatfiles CNAME xmpp
fileproxy.xmpp CNAME xmpp
; Federated services which are offered under their own hostnames (even if on
; the same server instance and port) federate with the same mechanisms, so you
; need an SRV or just an address record if on the default ports.
; Which remote servers will actually use SRV is more open to question.
conference CNAME xmpp-s2s
_xmpp-server._tcp.conference SRV 10 2 5269 xmpp-s2s
; Services which are modules and need their own hostnames, but are not
; federated within XMPP, don't need the SRV record
pubsub.xmpp CNAME xmpp-s2s
chat A 203.0.113.175
AAAA 2001:db8::f0ab:cdef:1234:f00f
proxy-chatfiles.chat CNAME chat
fileproxy.chat CNAME chat
conference.chat CNAME chat
pubsub.chat CNAME chat
_xmpp-server._tcp.conference SRV 10 2 5269 chat
; Chat server hostnames }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Random other hostnames {{{
auth AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:6175:7468
kpeople AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:6b70:706c
ocsp.security AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:6f63:7370
webauth AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:7765:6261
news-feed A 192.0.2.93
AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:6e6e:7470
; This is for Go package downloads, keeping the canonical names of modules
; in domains under our control, so that we're not locked into one code-hosting
; provider.
go CNAME abcdefghijklmn.cloudfront.net.
; Do *not* deploy TLSA until cloudfront.net is signed
; (or we use ALIAS-type records)
;_443._tcp.go CNAME _amazon-tlsa
foo A 192.0.2.200
; Random other hostnames }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Per-person email sub-domains {{{
; Household dedicated mail domains where *@person.example.org can receive email
; Gladys receives email here but never sends from this address
; (Gladys has probably forgotten this exists and will roll her eyes at it.)
gladys MX 10 mx
$ORIGIN gladys.example.org.
_adsp._domainkey TXT "dkim=all"
_dmarc TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-notify@example.org; ruf=mailto:dmarc-notify@example.org; adkim=s"
_report TXT "r=abuse-reports@example.org; rf=ARF; re=postmaster@example.org;"
_smtp._tls TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:smtp-tls-reports@example.org"
_smtp-tlsrpt TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:smtp-tls-reports@example.org"
$ORIGIN example.org.
; Fred sends and receives email in this domain
fred MX 10 mx
$ORIGIN fred.example.org.
; Also have a web-server for some old OpenID stuff
@ A 192.0.2.93 ; services
@ AAAA 2001:db8::48:4558:5345:5256 ; services
TXT "v=spf1 ip4:192.0.2.25 ip6:2001:db8::1:25 mx include:_spf.example.com ~all"
;
d201911._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA8/OMUa3PnWh9LqXFVwlAgYDdTtbq3zTtTOSBmJq5yWauzXYcUuSmhW7CsV0QQlacCsQgJlwg9Nl1vO1TosAj5EKUCLTeSqjlWrM7KXKPx8FT71Q9H9wXX4MHUyGrqHFo0OPzcmtHwqcd8AD6MIvJHSRoAfiPPBp8Euc0wGnJZdGS75Hk+wA3MQ2/Tlz" "P2eenyiFyqmUTAGOYsGC/tREsWPiegR/OVxNGlzTY6quHsuVK7UYtIyFnYx9PGWdl3b3p7VjQ5V0Rp+2CLtVrCuS6Zs+/3NhZdM7mdD0a9Jgxakwa1le5YmB5lHTGF7T8quy6TlKe9lMUIRNjqTHfSFz/MwIDAQAB"
d201911e2._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=rQNsV9YcPJn/WYI1EDLjNbN/VuX1Hqq/oe4htbnhv+A="
;
d202003._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAvpnx7tnRxAnE/poIRbVb2i+f1uQCXWnBHzHurgEyZX0CmGaiJuCbr8SWOW2PoXq9YX8gIv2TS3uzwGv/4yA2yX9Z9zar1LeWUfGgMWLdCol9xfmWrI+6MUzxuwhw/mXwzigbI4bHoakh3ez/i3J9KPS85GfrOODqA1emR13f2pG8EzAcje+rwW2PtYj" "c0h+FMDpeLuPYyYszFbNlrkVUneesxnoz+o4x/s6P14ZoRqz5CR7u6G02HwnNaHads5Eto6FYYErUUTtFmgWuYabHxgLVGRdRQs6B5OBYT/3L2q/lAgmEgdy/QL+c0Psfj99/XQmO8fcM0scBzw2ukQzcUwIDAQAB"
d202003e2._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=0DAPp/IRLYFI/Z4YSgJRi4gr7xcu1/EfJ5mjVn10aAw="
;
_adsp._domainkey TXT "dkim=all"
_dmarc TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-notify@example.org; ruf=mailto:dmarc-notify@example.org; adkim=s"
_report TXT "r=abuse-reports@example.org; rf=ARF; re=postmaster@example.org;"
_smtp._tls TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:smtp-tls-reports@example.org"
_smtp-tlsrpt TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:smtp-tls-reports@example.org"
$ORIGIN example.org.
; Per-person email sub-domains }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; {{{PGP-Keys-And-Fingerprints
; RFC4398 Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS)
; type tag algorithm <data>
; type 3 = PGP
; type 6 = IPGP
; IPGP fingerprint length, fingerprint, URL; either FP or URL may be empty
; gnupg comes with tools/make-dns-cert.c
;
; There's a lack of clarity about what clients do given a dot in the email LHS,
; so I solve it by publishing both with the dot escaped to be part of the label,
; and the dot introducing DNS hierarchy.
;
;;;fred CERT 6 0 0 FKy7QyQ5Ot41Fdot2k0ekA4UwcwEaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc2VjdXJpdHkuc3BvZGh1aXMub3JnL1BHUC9rZXlzLzB4NEQxRTkwMEUxNEMxQ0MwNC5hc2M=
;;;fred.bloggs CERT 6 0 0 FKy7QyQ5Ot41Fdot2k0ekA4UwcwEaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc2VjdXJpdHkuc3BvZGh1aXMub3JnL1BHUC9rZXlzLzB4NEQxRTkwMEUxNEMxQ0MwNC5hc2M=
;;;fred\.bloggs CERT 6 0 0 FKy7QyQ5Ot41Fdot2k0ekA4UwcwEaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc2VjdXJpdHkuc3BvZGh1aXMub3JnL1BHUC9rZXlzLzB4NEQxRTkwMEUxNEMxQ0MwNC5hc2M=
;
; I used:
; perl -MMIME::Base64 -le '$_ = $ARGV[0]; s/\s+//g; s/(..)/chr(hex($1))/eg;
; $_=chr(length($_)) . $_ . $ARGV[1]; print encode_base64($_, "")' \
; "$(gpg --with-colons --fingerprint $gpg_key | perl -F: -lane 'print $F[9] if $F[0] eq "fpr"')" \
; https://www.security.example.org/PGP/keys/0x0123456789ABCDEF.asc
;
; Note that my first attempt omitted the length. Oops. The first octet of
; the base64 data is the length; following octets, for that length, is the
; fingerprint, in raw binary form; any remaining octets are the URL.
; With the URL in, we might have with key 0x0123456789ABCDEF :
; FKy7QyQ5Ot41Fdot2k0ekA4UwcwEaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc2VjdXJpdHkuc3BvZGh1aXMub3JnL1BHUC9rZXlzLzB4NEQxRTkwMEUxNEMxQ0MwNC5hc2M=
;; WKD is https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service/?include_text=1
;; and included above with SRV records
;; https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey/?include_text=1
;; rev 00: so draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-00.txt
;; NOW: RFC 7929 (experimental)
; Generated by my gnupg-exportsof-mykey tooling; this is from output file
; dns-examplecom-pgp.openpgpkey.db
; This is the 2020 Ed25519 key. It's smaller, so it's marginally less insane
; to have it in DNS.
;
; For example.org redaction: leaving this intact, original PGP key, there
; are email addresses buried in the key, and human names. But changing
; the DNS labels and comments for zone consistency.
; You can get the original name just by looking up the fingerprint below
; the ORIGIN:
$ORIGIN _openpgpkey.example.org.
; 4833892924C60A7AE666D32A1DA3E68F41CEECAC
; Fred Bloggs <fred.bloggs@example.org>
;;;6555f290b6e653629d9d582660dd2fe730320e43e252f8e2e5ee1bdd TYPE61 \# 1239 (
;;; 9833045e2504f516092b06010401da470f0101074043c292df50b30dcaadd549
;;; cf48fd9cbc06e43c3a9ca1cb788da0bd3c00ffc750b4245068696c2050656e6e
;;; 6f636b203c7068696c4070656e6e6f636b2d746563682e636f6d3e888e041316
;;; 080036021b03030b090703150a080416030201021e0102178002190116210448
;;; 33892924c60a7ae666d32a1da3e68f41ceecac05025e250723000a09101da3e6
;;; 8f41ceecac2b46010081e1c09a255705b3fdda16a5485e6ec25edeabac78c92d
;;; aa5f6c1af2b71cc93800fe364bd0438dd5120585a034327e69757aa58ca0890a
;;; d7691cba343c55cf957806b41c5068696c2050656e6e6f636b203c7064704067
;;; 6e7570672e6e65743e888b041316080033021b03030b090703150a0804160302
;;; 01021e010217801621044833892924c60a7ae666d32a1da3e68f41ceecac0502
;;; 5e250723000a09101da3e68f41ceecac4faf00ff4bc1c3a4389cb5bb9cb90026
;;; c416f2ad99be2a6e0fe2ceea0bfa8e175e02c0eb0100eb8a11ec88b21ffa08c3
;;; 0a71afd04dc43d093fabcb9c5ae2de0b9c627e88670eb4285068696c2050656e
;;; 6e6f636b203c7068696c2e70656e6e6f636b4073706f64687569732e6f72673e
;;; 888b041316080033021b03030b090703150a080416030201021e010217801621
;;; 044833892924c60a7ae666d32a1da3e68f41ceecac05025e250724000a09101d
;;; a3e68f41ceecacc40800ff6702abcf89ddfe3ed0670953ca6a0a33ff4d6d83bf
;;; 8b4496cc299abedfb4947401008ab97f09df18813ad998de3fe3c55085b49f56
;;; ee1f68cac298be4be6d4f34906b41b5068696c2050656e6e6f636b203c706470
;;; 406578696d2e6f72673e888b041316080033021b03030b090703150a08041603
;;; 0201021e010217801621044833892924c60a7ae666d32a1da3e68f41ceecac05
;;; 025e250724000a09101da3e68f41ceecac9dbf0100f3eac82b9ef48d4cabc522
;;; 44cbd52ed9392a2ad4111d8f6b0aa33f8859e956c301008653862e15970d7601
;;; 57764064209c2ca8a9a616b1441e0e670b96458fd1a90eb838045e2504f5120a
;;; 2b0601040197550105010107401ea56299a543466023db5f4d4f1452450a393a
;;; fcb9039ada0c27e2dc7f59752f03010807887e04181608002616210448338929
;;; 24c60a7ae666d32a1da3e68f41ceecac05025e2504f5021b0c05090966018000
;;; 0a09101da3e68f41ceecac624d00fe30c7b6e6bbe930e899c270f4f17de5bdae
;;; 55612f9d69cb7490f6a4a4d04f261600ff58e26ae9fc3324de9bd51a77ff65d4
;;; 2af60294f55a03fe0f1ec316e4f5b8e70bb833045e25054016092b06010401da
;;; 470f010107406df5a87cd9b51890f84f7e597ab17e549f1ba093844178ea61ce
;;; ac484b4a58e988ef0418160800201621044833892924c60a7ae666d32a1da3e6
;;; 8f41ceecac05025e250540021b02008109101da3e68f41ceecac762004191608
;;; 001d16210436bea421261c40a54fc9261c2e7665110f8a56ff05025e25054000
;;; 0a09102e7665110f8a56ff0bb500ff4aee429d5659915336511a3b744c4c25fd
;;; d09fb8af2962c57e279b1906ad5e040100a8616e0d4def13d7910c30a595e7fc
;;; 92308de87404b96fa17325b6ef6cd7e9029f260100c2fe3edf9bbfce3c42317c
;;; a93bdbc4e52dd98bd2f782eb708edca1fbd7c345e50100dc69c0cc5a2481dc79
;;; 08162d7c6d185c8866498eb87d159e0eb3877d68de2b02
;;; )
; {{{PGP-PKA-Records
; Phil notes, since the actual records below are "as output by gpg" for easier maintenance.
; TYPE37 == CERT
; During early GnuPG 2.1.x, GnuPG switched from v1 PKA to v2; details at:
; <https://incenp.org/notes/2015/keys-in-dns.html>
; => local-part is zooko's base32 of LHS (as seen from src), type is CERT/IPGP, no URL
; so _very_ similar to the records already above where I chose to use CERT/IPGP ages ago.
;
; pip install zbase32 ; python # zbase32 is python2-only
; import hashlib, zbase32
; lhs = 'fob' # fred o bloggs
; print(zbase32.zbase32.b2a(hashlib.sha1(lhs.lower()).digest()))
; That gets us the left-hand-side.
;
; Skimming code, it looks as though the PKA lookup really does just re-use the older IPGP
; code, which can return a URL; `gpg2.1.15 --auto-key-locate pka` got a fingerprint but then
; errored on getting the key. So instead, let's experiment by grabbing our own CERT from above,
; shoving it into this namespace and changing the LHS to use the zb32 encoded variants
; (which also handles `.` vs `\.` issues).
;
; Discovery from log.dirmngr : tries to access
; <https://www.security.example.org:443/pks/lookup?op=get&options=mr&search=0x0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567>
; Okay, so change the hostname to `sks.example.org` and we should be good, as the PGP keyserver will get it
; % perl -MMIME::Base64 -le '$_ = $ARGV[0]; s/\s+//g; s/(..)/chr(hex($1))/eg;
; $_=chr(length($_)) . $_ . $ARGV[1]; print encode_base64($_, "")' \
; "$(gpg --with-colons --fingerprint $pgp_key_main | perl -F: -lane 'print $F[9] if $F[0] eq "fpr"')" \
; https://sks.example.org
; FKy7QyQ5Ot41Fdot2k0ekA4UwcwEaHR0cHM6Ly9za3Muc3BvZGh1aXMub3Jn
;
; 2018-07-14 after turning down sks.example.org:
; % perl -MMIME::Base64 -le '$_ = $ARGV[0]; s/\s+//g; s/(..)/chr(hex($1))/eg; $_=chr(length($_)) . $_ . $ARGV[1]; print encode_base64($_, "")' \
; "$(gpg --with-colons --fingerprint $pgp_key_main | perl -F: -lane 'if ($F[0] eq "fpr") {print $F[9]; exit}')" \
; http://ha.pool.sks-keyservers.net
; FKy7QyQ5Ot41Fdot2k0ekA4UwcwEaHR0cDovL2hhLnBvb2wuc2tzLWtleXNlcnZlcnMubmV0
; ...
; But that's not working with GnuPG. Just junk all of the above.
; Use my pka.py script and drop the keyserver entirely.
; gpg2.1 --export-options export-minimal,export-pka --export 0x0123456789ABCDEF
$ORIGIN _pka.example.org.
; Fingerprint: 0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567
; <fred.bloggs@example.org>
;;;kwj7zzgek39st5d5q81hq517e3iuzbr4 CERT 6 0 0 FKy7QyQ5Ot41Fdot2k0ekA4UwcwE
; Fingerprint: 0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567
; <fob@example.org>
;;;ajh79yijhx3xmeadhc79zrje7ret3qzr CERT 6 0 0 FKy7QyQ5Ot41Fdot2k0ekA4UwcwE
$ORIGIN example.org.
; }}}PGP-PKA-Records
; }}}PGP-Keys-And-Fingerprints
; Removed localhost entries: cookie stealing etc
;;; ======================================================================
; Sub-domains with email and other services {{{
mailtest MX 10 mx
$ORIGIN mailtest.example.org.
;
d201911._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAo9xHnjHyhm1weA6FjOqM8LKVsklFt26HXWoe/0XCdmBG4i/UzQ7RiSgWO4kv7anPK6qf6rtL1xYsHufaRXG8yLsZxz+BbUP99eZvxZX78tMg4cGf+yU6uFxulCbOzsMy+8Cc3bbQTtIWYjyWBwnHdRRrCkQxjZ5KAd+x7ZB5qzqg2/eLJ7fCuNsr/xn" "0XTY6XYgug95e3h4CEW3Y+bkG81AMeJmT/hoVTcXvT/Gm6ZOUmx6faQWIHSW7qOR3VS6S75HOuclEUk0gt9r7OQHKl01sXh8g02SHRk8SUMEoNVayqplYZTFFF01Z192m7enmpp+St+HHUIT6jW/CAMCO3wIDAQAB"
d201911e2._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=afulDDnhaTzdqKQN0jtWV04eOhAcyBk3NCyVheOf53Y="
;
d202003._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAs2BTVZaVLvL3qZBPaF7tRR0SdOKe+hjcpQ5fqO48lEuYiyTb6lkn8DPjDK11gTN3au0Bm+y8KC7ITKSJosuJXytxt3wqc61Pwtmb/Cy7GzmOF1AuegydB3/88VbgHT5DZucHrh6+ValZk4Trkx+/1K26Uo+h2KL2n/Ldb1y91ATHujp8DqxAOhiZ7KN" "aS1okNRRB4/14jPufAbeiN8/iBPiY5Hl80KHmpjM+7vvjb5jiecZ1ZrVDj7eTES4pmVh2v1c106mZLieoqDPYaf/HVbCM4E4n1B6kjbboSOpANADIcqXxGJQ7Be7/Sk9f7KwRusrsMHXmBHgm4wPmwGVZ3QIDAQAB"
d202003e2._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=iqwH/hhozFdeo1xnuldr8KUi7O7g+DzmC+f0SYMKVDc="
;
_adsp._domainkey TXT "dkim=all"
_dmarc TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-notify@example.org; ruf=mailto:dmarc-notify@example.org; adkim=s"
_report TXT "r=abuse-reports@example.org; rf=ARF; re=postmaster@example.org;"
_smtp._tls TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:smtp-tls-reports@example.org"
_smtp-tlsrpt TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:smtp-tls-reports@example.org"
$ORIGIN example.org.
; Stub to show that SKS has been withdrawn; we no longer have email in this
; domain (it was used for PGP exchange with two non-SKS keyservers).
$ORIGIN sks.example.org.
_pgpkey-http._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
_pgpkey-https._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
_hkp._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
$ORIGIN sks-peer.example.org.
_pgpkey-http._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
_pgpkey-https._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
_hkp._tcp SRV 0 0 0 .
; This is used for a dynamic DNS entry for my home router; at one point the
; router I was using supported various HTTP-based updates but not Dynamic DNS
; updates, so I switched to HE and have never switched that one back.
$ORIGIN yoyo.example.org.
@ NS ns5.he.net.
@ NS ns4.he.net.
@ NS ns3.he.net.
@ NS ns2.he.net.
@ NS ns1.he.net.
$ORIGIN example.org.
; khard: kubernetes the hard way, Google, `xyz-2` project
; gcloud dns managed-zones create khard --description="Kubernetes The Hard Way HD2" --dns-name="khard.example.org."
; gcloud dns managed-zones describe khard
khard IN NS ns-cloud-d1.googledomains.com.
khard IN NS ns-cloud-d2.googledomains.com.
khard IN NS ns-cloud-d3.googledomains.com.
khard IN NS ns-cloud-d4.googledomains.com.
;;;khard IN DS 15247 8 2 C7CAF8A6EFF0E6E7E811D68CDD87AD2EC135CB501A959FACBA3BC13F93F59864
; Sub-domains with email and other services }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Stubs to reject email to some hosts {{{
; Hosts which should not appear as senders but are abused by spammers because
; of parsing message-id headers:
realhost MX 0 .
realhost TXT "v=spf1 -all"
_25._tcp.realhost TLSA 03 00 00 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
; Stubs to reject email to some hosts }}}
;;; ======================================================================
; Domain verifications for some tools {{{
; <https://help.github.com/en/articles/verifying-your-organizations-domain>
; "Optionally, once the "Verified" badge is visible on your organization's
; profile page, you can delete the TXT entry from the DNS record at your domain
; hosting service."
;_github-challenge-ExampleOrg TXT "" ; dropped value when commented out
; <https://docs.aws.amazon.com/acm/latest/userguide/gs-acm-validate-dns.html>
; "ACM automatically renews your certificate for as long as the certificate is
; in use and the CNAME record that ACM created for you remains in place in your
; DNS database. You can stop automatic renewal by removing the certificate from
; the AWS service with which it is associated or by deleting the CNAME record."
_fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210.go.example.org. CNAME _45678901234abcdef45678901234abcd.ggedgsdned.acm-validations.aws.
; -- added 2019-10-09; leave in place, no scheduled removal.
; Google Webmaster
; added 2020-01-26 login fred@example.net
; to allow usage in oauth consent screens.
; Must be left in place.
opqrstuvwxyz CNAME gv-abcdefghijklmn.dv.googlehosted.com.
; postmaster.google.com (CNAME alternative to TXT on top-level domain):
zyxwvutsrqpo CNAME gv-nmlkjihgfedcba.dv.googlehosted.com.
; Bing (I didn't record the policy back when I added this)
0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef CNAME verify.bing.com.
; Domain verifications for some tools }}}
; vim: set filetype=bindzone foldmethod=marker :
Reference in a new issue View git blame Copy permalink