the-bastion/etc/ssh/ssh_config.freebsd

# Hardened SSH bastion config -- modify wisely!
# Based on https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Guidelines/OpenSSH
# With modifications where applicable/needed

# hardened params follow. every non-needed feature is disabled by default,
# following the principle of least rights and least features (more enabled
# features mean a more important attack surface).

# === FEATURES ===

# disable non-needed sshd features
Tunnel no
ForwardAgent no
ForwardX11 no
GatewayPorts no
ControlMaster no

# === CRYPTOGRAPHY ===

# enforce the use of ssh version 2 protocol, version 1 is disabled.
# all sshd_config options regarding protocol 1 are therefore omitted.
Protocol 2

# list of allowed ciphers.
# chacha20-poly1305 is a modern cipher, considered very secure
# aes is still the standard, we prefer gcm cipher mode, but also
# allow ctr cipher mode for compatibility (ctr is considered secure)
# we deny arcfour(rc4), 3des, blowfish and cast
# for older remote servers (or esoteric hardware), we might need to add: aes256-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes128-cbc
# known gotchas:
# - BSD (https://lists.freebsd.org/pipermail/freebsd-bugs/2013-June/053005.html) needs aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com DISABLED
# - Old Cisco IOS (such as v12.2) only supports aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc
# - Ancient Debians (Sarge) and RedHats (7) only support aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se,aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr

# list of allowed message authentication code algorithms.
# etm (encrypt-then-mac) are considered the more secure, we
# prefer umac (has been proven secure) then sha2.
# for older remote servers, fallback to the non-etm version of
# the algorithms. we deny md5 entirely.
# for older remote servers (or esoteric hardware), we might need to add: hmac-sha1
# Known gotchas:
# - Old Cisco IOS (such as v12.2) only supports hmac-sha1,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5,hmac-md5-96
# - Ancient Debians (Sarge) and RedHats (7) only support hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
MACs umac-128-etm@openssh.com,umac-64-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256

# List of allowed key exchange algorithms.
# we prefer curve25519-sha256 which is considered the most modern/secure,
# and still allow diffie hellman with group exchange using sha256 which is
# the most secure dh-based kex.
# we avoid algorithms based on the disputed NIST curves, and anything based
# on sha1.
# known gotchas:
# - Windows needs diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and also needs to NOT have diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 present in the list AT ALL
# - OmniOS 5.11 needs diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
# - Old Cisco IOS (such as v12.2) only supports diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
# - Ancient Debians (Sarge) and RedHats (7) only support diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256

# === AUTHENTICATION ===

# we allow only public key authentication ...
PubkeyAuthentication yes
# ... not password nor keyboard-interactive
# ... (set to yes if sshpass is to be used)
PasswordAuthentication no
# ChallengeResponseAuthentication=yes forces KbdInteractiveAuthentication=yes in the openssh code!
ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
KbdInteractiveAuthentication yes
# ... not host-based
HostbasedAuthentication no
# now we specify the auth methods order we want for manual ssh calls.
# NOTE1: as per the ssh source code, an auth method omitted hereafter
# will not be used, even if set to "yes" above.
# NOTE2: the bastion code (namely, ttyrec), will always set the proper
# value explicitly on command-line (pubkey OR sshpass), so the value
# specified hereafter will be ignored. if you want to force-disable
# a method, set it to "no" in the list above, as those will never be
# overridden by the code.
PreferredAuthentications publickey,keyboard-interactive

# === LOGIN ###

# disable escape character use
EscapeChar none

# detect if a hostkey changed due to DNS spoofing
CheckHostIP yes

# ignore ssh-agent, only use specified keys (-i)
IdentitiesOnly yes
# disable auto-lookup of ~/.ssh/id_rsa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa etc.
IdentityFile /dev/non/existent/file

# carry those vars to the other side (includes LC_BASTION)
SendEnv LANG LC_*

# allow usage of SSHFP DNS records
VerifyHostKeyDNS ask

# yell if remote hostkey changed
StrictHostKeyChecking ask

# === SYSTEM ===

# don't hash the users known_hosts files, in the context of a bastion, this adds no security
HashKnownHosts no

# send an ssh ping each 57 seconds to the client and disconnect after 5 no-replies
ServerAliveInterval 57
ServerAliveCountMax 5